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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78A-4-103.
CONSTITIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
There are no constitutional provisions which apply to this appeal. The relevant
statutory provisions are limited to Utah Code Annotated §30-1-4.5.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. Richards commenced this action by filing a Verified Petition for Paternity and
Related Matters on December 21, 2006. (R. 1-8).
2. In the Verified Petition for Paternity and Related Matters, Richards alleged in the
relevant part:
a. The parties had never been married (R. 1);
b. The parties continually resided together for over 10 years seeking an
order establishing a common law marriage pursuant to UCA §30-1-4.5
(R. 3);
c. The parties cohabitated from May 1995 until their separation in early
2006 (R. 3);
d. The parties are both of legal age and capable of giving consent (R. 3);
e. The parties have held themselves out and acquired a reputation as
husband and wife (R. 4);

5

f. The Court should find the parties established a common law marriage
and enter appropriate orders concerning custody, child support, and
property divisions (R. 4-5); and
g. The Court should make an equitable division of the residential property
awarding Richards a financial interest in the property representing his
reasonable investment based on the parties' partnership, implied
contract, or constructive trust (R. 6).
3. On January 10, 2007, Brown filed her Answer to the Verified Petition for
Paternity and Related Matters. (R. 28-38).
4. In her Answer, Brown responded to the allegations, in the relevant part, by:
a. Admitting the parties were never married (R. 28);
b. Affirmatively denying that the parties separated in early 2006, alleging
the parties separated in August, 2005 and therefore do not meet the
cohabitation element for the establishment of a common law marriage
(R. 29); and
c. Denial of all relief requested by Richards relating to any property and
affirmatively alleging there was no property to be divided (R. 30).
5. On June 19, 2007, Richards filed his Certificate of Readiness for Trial wherein he
certified that "counsel has completed all discovery; that opposing counsel has had
reasonable time to pursue discovery; and that all discovery of record has been
completed." (R. 41-42).
6

6. On June 19, 2007, Richards filed a financial declaration wherein he averred that he
owned no interests in any real property. (R. 43-55).
7. On August 8, 2007, Brown filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment relating
to whether Richards timely filed his request for the establishment of a common
law marriage. (R. 72-81).
8. On August 8, 2007, Brown filed her Affidavit of Diana Brown in Support of
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, wherein she alleged:
a. She purchased the home on 459 12 Avenue in December, 1989. (R. 82);
b. She and Richards began residing together in May, 1995. (R. 82);
c. They cohabitated until the summer of 2001 when they moved into separate
bedrooms and completely terminated all sexual relations with one another. (R.
83);
d. Richards moved out of the residence at the end of August, 2005 and took up
residence at 635 K Street where he continued to reside. (R. 83); and
e. The Verified Petition filed in December, 2006 was more than one year after
they separated in August, 2005. (R. 83).
9. On September 5, 2007, Richards filed his Response to Respondent's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment. (R. 87-93).
10. Richards did not file an affidavit in support of his Response to Respondent's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
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11. On September 5, 2007, the Honorable Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett
recommended that the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment be granted. (R. 94).
12. On September 10, 2007, Richards filed his Objection to Commissioner's
Recommendation. (R. 95-99).
13. On October 15, 2007, the Court entered its Order on Motion for Partial i
Judgment. (R. 110-113).
14. On January 9, 2008, the Court entered its Memorandum Decision on Richards
Objection to Commissioner's Recommendation, thereby denying the objection.
(R. 121-123).
15. In the Memorandum Decision, the Court relied on Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d
669 (Utah 1985) for a definition of "cohabitation" which included common
residency and sexual contact evidencing a conjugal association. The Court found
that it was undisputed that the parties terminated all sexual contact in 2001 and
Richards moved out of the residence in September, 2005. The Court found
Richards had one year from the date of the termination of the common law
marriage to file his Petition and his petition was not timely filed. (R. 121-123).
16. On March 24, 2008, despite having previously filed a Certificate of Readiness for
Trial asserting that all discovery had been completed, Richards filed his Certificate
of Service of Petitioner's First Set of Interrogatories, Request for Production of
Documents and Admissions to Respondent. (R. 130-131).
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17. On May 1, 2008, Brown filed a Certificate of Mailing Respondent's Answers to
Petitioner's First Set of Interrogatories, Request for Production of Documents and
Admissions to Respondent. (R. 139-140).
18. On May 1, 2008, Brown filed a Motion for Protective Order, Memorandum in
Support, and an Attorney Certification RE: Motion for Protective Order, asserting
that many of the discovery requests relate to matters previously decided on the
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (R. 141-154).
19. After full briefing, on June 9, 2008, the Court entered its Minute Entry granting
the Motion for Protective Order. (R. 193-195).
20. As a basis for granting the Motion for Protective Order, the Court found that:
a. Richards failed to perform his obligations to meet and confer pursuant
to Rule 26(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and therefore was not
entitled to pursue discovery. (R. 194); and
b. the matter was set for trial in two weeks. (R. 194).
21. The action came before the Court on a bench trial on June 16, 2008, with all trial
exhibits presented to the Court based on stipulation and the parties as the only
witnesses testifying. (R. 225-226).
22. Richards testified. (R. 262). (The references to the transcript hereinafter will be
designated "Tr.").
23. Richards admitted that at all times his marital status has been single. (Tr. P. 12, L.
22-23).
9

24. However, the parties lived together from May 1995 to August 2005 as
longstanding romantic partners. (Tr. 14, L. 3-6).
25. Brown owned the home in which the parties resided having acquired the residence
in approximately 1989. (Tr. P. 15, L. 4-10).
26. At the time of the parties' separation in August, 2005, Richards moved into a
separate residence approximately six blocks from where he resided with Brown in
the Avenues. (Tr. P. 16, L. 8-20).
27. After Richards moved out, the parties maintained a cooperative relationship so far
as it concerned their daughter, including maintaining family celebrations. (Tr. P.
17, L. 7-11).
28. After the separation, Richards maintained a unilateral hope for reconciliation. (Tr.
P. 18, L. 7-10).
29. In October, 2005, approximately two months after the parties separated, they
engaged in mediation and resolved all issues relating to parenting by adopting a
parenting plan, but did not address financial issues because the parties allotted
time for mediation expired and Brown refused to return to mediation. (Tr. P. 21,
L. 15 to P. 22, L. 10).
30. In explaining why he did not file his petition for establishment of a common law
marriage within one year of the date of the parties' separation, Richards professed
ignorance of that requirement in the law. (Tr. P. 24, L. 21-23).
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31. Richards believed he had an interest in the residence based on his financial
contributions to the mortgage, maintenance expenses, and improvements. (Tr. P.
25, L. 6-16).
32. Initially, Richards paid $400 per month toward the mortgage. (Tr. P. 26, L. 1-4).
33. Thereafter, he voluntarily increased that amount to $550 per month after the birth
of the parties' daughter. At the time Richards was paying $550 per month, the
mortgage was over $1,500.00 per month. (Tr. P. 26, L. 5-10).
34. Over the ten year period Richards resided with Brown, he paid $71,100.00
towards the mortgage. (Tr. P. 28, L. 1-5 and P. 67, L. 9-12).
35.Neither Richards nor Brown owned any other real property. (Tr. P. 28, L. 17-19).
36. During the period of common residency, the parties' income was close to equal.
(Tr.P.29,L. 11-19).
37. The parties never had a joint bank account. (Tr. P. 29, L. 23-24).
38. While Richards listed Brown as his beneficiary on his life insurance, in contrast
Brown listed the parties' minor daughter as her beneficiary. (Tr. P. 30, L. 2-9).
39. During their common residency, each party paid their own personal expenses, but
as to household expenses, they tallied them up and then reconciled who owed what
to whom based on who spent what during that accounting period. (Tr. P. 30, L. 10
to P. 31, L. 2).
40. Richards stated his understanding was that if the parties' relationship terminated,
Brown would reimburse him for some equity in the house. (Tr. P. 36, L. 9-17).
ll

41. At no time was there a written agreement between the parties concerning the
house. (Tr.P. 37,L. 6-10).
42. Richards contributed to the household maintenance costs. (Tr. P. 38, L. 6-20).
43. Richards testified the appraised value of the house in March, 2008, three years
after the parties' separation, was $425,000.00 and the mortgage balance was
$148,000.00 at the time he moved into the residence, leaving a total equity in the
property of $277,000.00 of which sixty six percent (66%) was subject to division
in this action. (Tr. P. 42, L. 7 to P. 43, L. 3).
44. Richards testified that he made approximately $10,485.00 worth of capital
improvements to the house including the cost of the construction of a deck. (Tr. P.
46, L. 3-25).
45. Richards conceded that Brown made capital improvements to the house to which
he did not contribute toward their cost. (Tr. P. 48, L. 4 to P. 49, L. 9).
46. With respect to those capital improvement contributions, Richards admitted that
had he desired to be reimbursed during the period of the parties' relationship, he
could have asked for such reimbursement and Brown probably would have agreed.
(Tr.P.49,L. 10-19).
47. Richards testified that annually the parties discussed his desire to be placed on title
to the house, but that the discussions never reached any level of detail. (Tr. P. 50,
51, and 53).
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48. Richards owned and maintained the only vehicle the parties used during their
relationship. However, Brown generally used public transportation for her own
individual transportation needs. (Tr. P. 55, L. 20 to P. 56, L. 23).
49. Richards asserted a claim for one half of all automobile expenses he incurred
during the decade of the parties' relationship. (Tr. P. 58).
50. Richards admitted there was no appraisal as to the value of the house on the date
he moved into the residence. (Tr. P. 63, L. 3-20).
51. Richards never paid an amount which equaled one half of the monthly mortgage
payments. (Tr. P. 68, L. 7-9).
52. Richards did not have the house appraised when he moved out in August, 2005,
waiting until March, 2008 to have such an appraisal performed. (Tr. P. 69, L. 2225 and P. 70, L. 11-12).
53. At the time of the trial, Richards was renting a home in the Avenues for $750 per
month. (Tr. P. 75, L. 4-6).
54. Brown admitted the parties discussed Richards' desire for an equity interest in the
home, but Brown conditioned any such equity position on Richards buying that
position by paying her one half of the equity in the home at the time of his being
put on to title. (Tr. P. 97, L. 16-19 and P. 98, L. 7-13).
55. Brown did not have an appraisal of the home done at the time of her divorce from
her husband Mr. Priest, leaving it to a mortgage company to calculate the equity in

13

the property at the time of that divorce being entered in approximately 1991. (Tr.
P. 115, L. 20-25).
56. Brown testified that no appraisal was performed when Richards moved into the
residence in May, 1995. (Tr. P. 116, L. 6-9).
57. When Richards was paying $400 per month, the mortgage on the home was
$1,187.00. (Tr.P. 116,L. 10-13).
58. The parties terminated all sexual relations in 2001, when their daughter was four
years old, and Richards moved into a separate bedroom within the house which
was located on an entirely different floor in the house than Brown's bedroom. (Tr.
P. 118, L. 16 to P. 119,L. 15).
59. When questioned by the Court, Richards admitted that some percentage of the
money he paid toward the rent would have been used to pay rent elsewhere had he
not been residing with Brown. (Tr. P. 138, L. 3-26).
60. During Richards closing argument, the Court noted that unjust enrichment is a
restitutionary remedy which does not include a claim for appreciation. (Tr. P. 143,
L. 40 to P. 144, L. 8).
61. During his closing Richards admitted there was no meeting of the minds
concerning his investment in the house. (Tr. P. 149, L. 15-17 and P. 151, L. 1418).
62. Richards conceded the theory of constructive trust did not apply. (Tr. P. 161, L. 89).
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63. Richards admitted that there was no evidence presented concerning some of the
elements of promissory estoppels. (Tr. P. 163, L. 4-16).
64. Richards conceded there was no implied in fact contract, arguing despite the lack
of evidence concerning some of the elements of promissory estoppels his only two
remaining claims were for unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel. (Tr. P.
164, L. 14 to P. 165, L. 16).
65. After taking the matter under advisement, on July 9, 2008, the Court issued its
Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. (R. 228-251).
66. The Court entered the following Findings of Fact:
a. The parties never married but began living together in 1995 and a daughter was
born on March 29, 1996. (R. 228, Finding #1);
b. During the ten years they resided together, they did so in a house owned by
Brown which she received as part of her prior divorce settlement from Erik
Priest on or about September, 1991. During that divorce proceeding, the
parties "figured out" their equity in the house and the Brown paid off Mr.
Priest's equity in the house. (R. 228-229, Finding #2);
c. The parties separated in August 2005 when Richards moved out of the house
and rented an apartment six blocks away, paying a monthly rent of $750 per
month. (R. 229, Finding #3);
d. Shortly after the separation, the parties mediated and resolved all issues
relating to the minor child. Richards expected to return to mediation to discuss
15

financial issues, but Brown refused. As a result of these delays, Richards did
not file his petition for the establishment of marriage until December 26, 2006,
more than one year after the Petitioner moved out of the residence. (R. 229,
Finding # 4);
e. Petitioner's Verified Petition stated three claims for relief including a
declaration of paternity coupled with joint legal and physical custody,
declaration of a common law marriage, and equitable distribution of property
based on theories of partnership, implied contract for services and/or
constructive trust. (R. 229-230, Finding #5);
f. Brown stipulated to the custody issues but disputed the timeliness of the
Petition for declaration of a common law marriage and jurisdiction of the Court
to divide the property. (R. 230, Finding #6);
g. The parties stipulated to the temporary orders relating to the child were to
become permanent, leaving for trial issues relating to property. (R. 230,
Finding # 7);
h. Respondent brought a motion for partial summary judgment declaring the
petition for declaration of a common law marriage was untimely. The
commissioner agreed and recommended the motion be granted. Richards
objected. The Court affirmed the Commissioner's recommendation. (R. 230,
Finding # 8).
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i. The parties are both trained nurses who met while Brown was still married and
were friends. Eventually, Brown was divorced and several years later, the
parties began living together. Their respective incomes were comparable. (R.
230-231, Finding #9);
j.

The parties never had joint bank accounts, but Brown kept detailed written
twice monthly tallies of expenditures incurred. The parties practice was that
after tallying the expenditures, they would equalize who paid for what through
reimbursement. (R. 231, Finding #10);

k. The tallies were not exhaustive and did not include all of the expenditures
incurred, but they accurately depicted their financial practices. Richards
testified that among the expenditures which were not "tallied" included his
expenditure of $8,895.00 to replace a deck, $312.00 towards a sprinkler
system, and $179.00 toward the purchase of a new ceiling fan. (R. 231-232,
Finding #11);
1. Richards testified when he first moved in, he paid $400 per month towards the
mortgage and when their daughter was born he voluntarily increased the
amount paid to $550 per month. When he got a raise, he increased the amount
to $650 per month. On occasion, he wrote the check directly to the mortgage
company. (R. 232, Finding 12);
m. While Richards acknowledged his payments were less than half the mortgage,
he was making other contributions to equalize the parties' expenditures,
17

including his provision of the only vehicle used by the parties which he
brought into the relationship. Brown admitted that Richards' financial
contributions approximately equaled her contributions. (R. 232-233, Finding
13);
n. The Court did not accept Brown's testimony the payments constituted rent. (R.
233, Finding #14);
o. At the time Richards moved in with Brown, her mortgage was $1187.00 per
month. The amount increased over the period of the ten year common
residency to $1,516.00. Further, due to refinancing, over the course of the
relationship, the mortgage balance increased rather than decreased. (R. 233234, Finding 15);
p. Richards testified he felt insecure about his financial position with respect to
equity in the house and that during the relationship Brown represented that if
the relationship terminated, he would be treated the same as was her husband
in the prior divorce proceeding. Richards believed that he and Brown had an
agreement concerning the equity in the property. (R. 234-235, Finding #16);
q. Brown testified the parties did have discussion concerning the equity in the
house, but stated that all such discussions were conditioned upon Richards
paying one half of the then existing equity. Richards denied having any
recollection of such conditions. (R. 235, Finding #17);
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r. Brown acknowledged it was important to Richards to have his name on title,
but testified she believed that he failed to take advantage of the opportunity
after two refinances during the relationship, and admitted that she never
provided him with an amount necessary to pay out one half of the equity.
Finally, Brown admitted she never seriously pursued any efforts to put
Richards on title. (R. 235, Finding #18);
s. The parties admitted that over the course of their relationship, the issue of
Richards being on title increased the contention in the relationship. Richards
testified that had he known he was not going to be put on title, he would have
made other financial choices. Brown admitted that had Richards paid her one
half of the equity, she would have put him on title. Finally, Brown stated as
the parties relationship difficulties increased, her desire to put Richards on title
lessened. (R. 236, Finding #19);
t. The Court found Brown had a greater understanding of what was entailed
when parties split up based on her involvement in a prior divorce proceeding.
(R. 236, Finding #20);
u. The Court found that as difficulties mounted between the parties, Brown never
clearly conveyed her position with respect to what interest in the home, if any,
she was willing to convey to Richards. (R. 236-237, Finding # 21);
v. Richards never took the steps necessary to clarify his position nor secure his
interest in the residence. He never took steps to have the home appraised and
19

therefore there was no information before the Court to assess how his
contributions enhanced the value of the home. During the period of
cohabitation, Brown twice refinanced the house and Richards chose not to take
those opportunities to resolve his concerns one way or the other. (R. 237,
Finding #22);
w. The parties had difficulties in 2001, which exacerbated by their dispute over
the house. They slept in different parts of the house. The parties intimate
relationship terminated around that time. (R. 237-238, Finding #23);
x. As part of these proceedings, the home was appraised on March 17, 2008
which concluded the present market value is $425,000. (R. 238, Finding #25);
y. While the Court had the present value of the home as evidence before it, there
was no evidence before the Court as to the value of the home when Richards
moved into the home in 1995 nor was there any evidence of its value when he
moved out in August, 2005. Finally, there was no evidence as to the value of
the house in 1991 when Brown acquired the home out of her prior divorce
proceeding. (R. 238-239, Finding #26);
z. While Richards presented evidence which was not disputed that he paid
$71,100 in monthly payments toward the mortgage, $960.03 in home
maintenance, $1,024.50 in lawn service, and $12,470 in other house expenses,
the majority of which related to nearly $9,000.00 to construct a deck, in most
cases the Court could not discern whether those expenses were incurred for
20

household improvements, or simply involved other expenses not related to an
improvement to the house. (R. 239, Finding #27)
aa. The Court reviewed the various items set forth in Exhibit 6-B and concluded
that the expenditures for the deck ($8,800.00), and the expenditures for the
purchase and installation of the swamp cooler, totaling $750.00, were
improvements to the house, however, the Court could not reach the same
conclusion for the majority of the other matters set forth on Exhibit 6-B. (R.
240-241, Findings #28 & 29).
67. Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court then entered the following
Conclusions of Law:
a. The home was clearly "premarital property" belonging to Brown. (R. 241,
Conclusion #30);
b. The parties never married, so there is no "marital estate" to divide. When the
parties resolved the custody related issues and the Court granted partial
summary judgment on the common law marriage claim, the case lost its
character as a "domestic" case. However, because Richards asserted civil
claims, the case proceeded to trial. In closing argument, Richards abandoned
all claims except unjust enrichment and promissory estoppels. (R. 241-242,
Conclusion No. 31);

c. Richards is not entitled to any share of equity in the home, although the Court
found he did set forth a claim for unjust enrichment. (R. 242, Conclusion No.
32);
d. After setting forth the elements of a claim for unjust enrichment, the Court
concluded that the evidence supported a claim of unjust enrichment for the
amount paid for the new deck ($8,895.00) and it would be unjust to permit
Brown to retain that benefit without paying the cost thereof. (R. 242-243,
Conclusion #33);
e. In addition, the Court made the same finding with respect to the costs incurred
for the purchase and installation of the swamp cooler ($750.00), sprinkler
system expenditures ($312.00), and the purchase of a ceiling fan ($179.00)
finding the total amount by which Brown was unjustly enriched to be
$10,136.00. (R. 243, Conclusion #34);
f. With respect to any other amounts, the Court found Richards failed to meet his
burden of proof. (R. 243, Conclusion #35);
g. The Court found it a closer issue whether Richards proved a right to make
claim for mortgage payments, yet the Court found Richards may not recover
any part of those payments. (R. 244, Conclusion #36);
h. The Court found Richards would not have been entitled to recover the full
amount of those payments because had he not been residing with Brown, he
would have incurred a housing expense elsewhere. The Court was not able to
22

adequately determine what amount should be attributed to a fair rental value of
the property. The best evidence before the Court was that prior to Richards
moving in with Brown, she rented a portion of her house to a friend for
$300.00 per month. Thereafter, Richards began paying $400 per month, then
$550 and ultimately $650 per month. After moving out of the residence,
Richards rented a housing unit for $750 per month. Thus, the Court concluded
that the amounts he contributed each month approximated the reasonable rental
value. (R. 244, Conclusion #37);
i. The Court gave little credence to Richard statements that but for his
understanding he was accruing equity in the residence, he would have made
other choices financially. The Court found that no evidence was presented to
the Court regarding his financial wherewithal to either pay a down payment or
secure a mortgage. Richards took no action to secure his position, which the
Court found suggests he was not in the position to do so. Therefore, the Court
concluded it could not being to assess what portion of those payments could
have created a partial equity interest for Richards. (R. 245, Conclusion #38);
j.

The Court concluded Richards failed to meet his burden of proof that any
portion of the $71,100 in payment unjustly enriched Brown. (R. 245-246,
Conclusion #39);

k. The Court concluded the rest of the expenditures were normal living
expenditures. (R. 246, Conclusion #40);
23

1. The Court then set forth the elements for promissory estoppels and concluded
that Richards failed to meet his burden of proof with respect to those elements.
The Court concluded that even if Richards met his burden with respect to
Brown's promise to put him on title to the house, he failed to meet his burden
with respect to the other two elements: reasonable reliance nor damage based
on that reliance. (R. 246, Conclusion 41);
m. The Court concluded there was no evidence that Richards acted prudently.
The Court concluded that a reasonable person concerned about the security of
his position with respect to equity in the house would have taken affirmative
steps to protect that interest. In addition, the Court concluded there was no
evidence presented to the Court that Richards suffered a loss. (R. 247,
Conclusion #42);
n. The Court concluded that Richards failed to meet his burden of proof that he
conferred a benefit on Brown with respect to the vehicle and related expenses
and therefore denied that claim. (R. 247-248, Conclusion #43);
o. The Court concluded there was no basis for an award of attorney fees based on
the claims of unjust enrichment or promissory estoppels. (R. 248-249,
Conclusion #44 & 45);
68. Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court entered the
following Order:
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a. Petitioner's counsel was to prepare and submit for the Court's signature a final
order and Determination of Paternity pursuant to the parties' stipulation. (R.
250, Order #47); and
b. With respect to all other issues addressed in this decision, the Court's Finding
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order shall be the final Order of the Court
and no other form of order will need to be submitted by counsel. (R. 250,
Order #48).
69. Counsel for Richards, the Petitioner, never submitted the final order and
determination of paternity pursuant to the parties' stipulation.
70. Brown paid Richards the sum of $10,136.00 as ordered by the Court. (A copy of
the payment and an Affidavit from the Title Company that the check cleared is
attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by this reference).
71. Richards has not filed a satisfaction of judgment in the trial court.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Richards failed to marshal the evidence relating to all factual issues. Richards also
waived his right to appeal based on acceptance of Brown's voluntary payment of the
judgment. The Court correctly held that upon the end of the parties' cohabitation, their
relationship terminated. The Court decided the issue as a matter of law, and therefore no
evidentiary hearing was necessary. The Court properly granted the protective order
based on the proximity to trial, the failure to comply with Rule 26(d), Utah R. Civ. P.,
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and Richards' Certificate of Readiness for Trial. The Court properly applied the correct
legal standard on the claims of unjust enrichment. The Court properly distinguished
home improvement expenses from maintenance expenses. Finally, Richards waived,
stipulated or abandoned his claims relating to implied contract and constructive trust.

ARGUMENT
I.
RICHARDS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE
With respect to all claims upon which Richards challenges the factual findings of
the Court, it was his burden to marshal the evidence. In Interest ofK.F., 2009 UT 4.
This obligation required Richards to provide this Court with all of the evidence which
supported the trial court's decision. Id. Richards failed to meet his burden of
marshalling. Therefore, this Court should deny his requests for relief.
II.
RICHARDS WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL
After the stipulation resolving the issues related to the parties' minor child, the
only remaining issues related to monetary relief. After hearing all of the evidence and
carefully considering that evidence, the Court concluded that with respect to the majority
of his claims, Richards failed to meet his burden of proof. (R. 243, Conclusion #35; R.
245-246, Conclusion #39; R. 246, Conclusion #41; R. 247-248, Conclusion #43).
However, with respect to monies paid for capital improvements including a deck, ceiling
fan, and swamp cooler, Richards met his burden of proof and was awarded a judgment in
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the amount of $10,136.00. (R. 243, Conclusion #34). Thereafter, Brown paid the
judgment in full. (Exhibit "A").
By accepting payment in full, Richards waived his right to appeal, rendering the
issues on appeal moot. In Jensen v. Eddy, 30 Utah 2d 154, 514 P.2d 1142 (1973), the
Court stated the general rule is that "if a judgment is voluntarily paid, which is accepted,
and a judgment satisfied, the controversy has become moot and the right to appeal is
waived." Id. At 157; see also West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Ca, 818 P.2d 1311, 1316
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); Jacobsen, Morrin & Robbins Constr. Co. v. St. Joseph High Sch.
Bd. Of Fin. Trs., 794 P.2d 505, 506 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Because Brown voluntarily
paid the judgment and payment was accepted by Richards, he waived his right to appeal
and rendered all monetary issues moot.1
III.

THE COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT UPON THE TERMINATON OF
COHABITATION, THE RELATIONSHIP TERMINATED AS A MATTER OF
LAW
The Court correctly held for purposes of the statute of repose for the establishment
and declaration of a common law marriage, the one year period to file after the
termination of the relationship begins to run when the parties ceased cohabiting.
Richards argues that the Court improperly overemphasized a single element,
cohabitation, over all other elements. In fact, if any one element ceases to exist a
common law marriage does not exist and therefore the relationship is terminated. While no
1

Brown admits there is no satisfaction of judgment in the record.
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single factor is determinative in the trial court's analysis, and while "numerous factors
should be considered," evidence proving each of the five statutory elements is essential.
See Whyte v. Blair, 885 P.2d 791, 793 (Utah 1994). The parties must make a showing of
capacity to marry, capacity to give consent, assumption of marital rights and duties,
cohabitation, and a holding out as, and acquiring a uniform and general reputation as,
husband and wife. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-l-4.5(l)(a)-(e) (1998). If any one of the
elements is missing, the relationship is terminated for purposes of the statute of repose.
The Court correctly found when the element of cohabitation no longer applied, the
relationship was terminated and the statue of repose was triggered requiring the filing of
the petition within one year of the termination of the relationship.
While Utah law has not clearly settled this issue, there are cases which are
relevant to the discussion. In In re Marriage ofKunz, 2006 UT App 151, 136 P.3d 1278,
the Court addressed whether a petition was timely filed under UCA §30-1-4.5. In Kunz,
the appellant argued that her petition was timely filed when it was brought within one
year of her husband's death. Appellee argued that because the decedent was
ceremonially married, upon his securing a marriage license, he was not longer legally
capable of consenting to a common law marriage. Thus, the one year period commenced
to run from the date the marriage license was issued. Implicitly, the Court ruled that
upon the failure of any one element, the statute of repose was triggered and the movant
had one year from that date to file a petition to establish the validity of the common law
marriage.
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Similarly, in Clark v. Clark, 2001 UT 44, 27 P.3d 538, the Court found that the
parties cohabited until they permanently separated on August 28, 1996. A few months
later, the Petitioner filed her action to establish a marriage. On appeal, the trial court's
decision was affirmed based on its finding that the parties ceased cohabiting, and
therefore their relationship terminated, within one year of the filing of the petition to
establish the marriage and for a resulting divorce. The instant case is similar to Clark. In
the instant case, the Court found the parties permanently separated in late August, or
early September, 2005. (R. 229, Finding #3). Richards did not file his Petition until
December, 2006. Therefore, the Court ruled the Petition was not timely filed based on
the date of the parties' permanent separation being the best evidence of the termination of
their relationship.
In Bunch v. Bunch, 906 P.2d 918 (Utah App. 1995), the Court considered
whether a petition was filed within one year of the termination of the relationship. In
Bunch, the parties separated in August 1990, and the petitioner filed her action in May,
1991. On a Motion to Dismiss, the Court granted the motion based on the failure to file
within one year of the termination of the relationship, i.e. the parties' separation in
August 1990. On appeal, the trial court was affirmed.
The foregoing supports the trial court's conclusion that upon the cessation of
cohabitation, the statute of repose began to run. Richards had one year from that date,
August or September, 2005. Richards failed to timely file the petition, doing so more
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than one year after the termination of the parties, the Court properly granted partial
summary judgment to Brown.
IV
THE COURT DID NOT NEED TO HOLD AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON
THE ISSUE OF WHEN THE RELATIONSHIP TERMINATED
No evidentiary hearing needed to be held on the question of when the parties'
relationship terminated because there were no genuine issues of material fact, and the
determination of when the relationship terminated was a question of law. As such, the
trial court was proper in deciding the issue on summary judgment.
Prior to the filing of the Motion for Summary Judgment, the record contained the
following relevant statements:
a. Richard's Verified Petition: (1) "Petitioner and Respondent have never been
married . .. " (R. 1, %L); (2) "The parties cohabited since at least May 1995
until their separation in earl 2006 . . . " (R. 3, Tfl4); (3) "The parties cohabited
together from at least May 1995 until early 2006." (R. 5, |23);
b. Affidavit of Steve Richards2: "We have resided together since May 1995 on a
continuous basis until separating initially in the fall of 2005 and on a
permanent basis in January 2006." (R. 13, ^[3);
c. Affidavit of Diana Brown in Support of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment: (1) "We cohabitated and stayed in the same room together until the
summer of 2001 at which time the romantic aspects of the relationship fully
deteriorated." (R. 83, f 5); (3) "During the summer of 2001, after effectively
severing all romantic aspects of our relationship, we moved into separate
bedrooms. I resided in the upstairs master bedroom and the Petitioner resided
in the main floor guest bedroom." (R. 83, |6); (4) "We no longer had any sort
of sexual relationship or any romantic relationship after the summer of 2001."
(R. 83, %7); and (5) "The Petitioner moved out of the 12th Avenue home at the
2

Richards Affidavit was filed in support of his Motion for Temporary Orders.
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end of August 2005 and took up reside] i^
to reside;" (R. 83^8);

f

r

-

" «

;

< response to Respondent's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment3: i % \ i he
parties have one child together, namely Stephanie A. Brown-Richards (DOB
3/29/96) and cohabited for approximately ten years from May 1995 until
Petitioner moved out of Respondent's home in approximately September
2005." (R. 87, f 1); and (2) 'The Petitioner states in his Verified petition Paternity and Related Matters that he considered his separation from
Respondent to be in early 2006 under UCA 30-1 -4.5(l)(c)." (R. 88, P ) .
While Brown supported her motion for partial summary judgrru t
.,». , .

achards faik\i u» ul<. a counter affidavit. Rule 56(e), Utah Rules uf Civil

Procedure clearlv-<tat/s.

When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided ..
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the
pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this ink
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for tria
Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to : 'e
such a response.
;v..i. :MSU mo'

•

( iv P Because Richards did not file an affidavit in opposition to the

•

d;:' ,;,

. ^ properly supported by Brown's affidavit, there

was no genuine issue of material fact.
While it is undisputed that based on the clear language of the rule Richards
faik ' *.• > -• *•

v

,*

* - I - . - . ;.;. 'nrougii uliiig iii> own counter affidavit,

Brown acknowledges the existence of a Verified i;

Richards did not file an affidavit in opposition lo I In.
Judgment.
11

i1 , P* I i(iu.n I

Summary

filed in support of his motion for temporary orders. (R. 1 and R. 13 respectively).
Despite the clarity of the rule, in Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696 (Utah 1985), the
Court acknowledged that in some cases, a verified petition may satisfy the rule's
requirement. Id. At 699. In determining whether a verified petition meets that
requirement, the Pentecost court stated a "verified pleading, made under oath and
meeting the requirements for affidavits established in Rule 56(e). . . can be considered
the equivalent of an affidavit for purposes of a motion for summary judgment." Id. In
Pentecost, the Court found the verified pleading failed to meet the requirements of Rule
56(e) because rather than stating the facts were true and correct, it merely verified the
pleading. Id. In addition, it impermissibly qualified the personal knowledge with
statements relating to "information" and "belief. Id. Finally, some of the statements
were not facts at all but rather assumptions or conclusions. Id.
Based on the standard set forth in Pentecost, one must review the documents on
file first against that standard. After making that determination, each of the documents
must be viewed as they relate to the specific factual averments contained Brown's
affidavit. A review of these documents based on these standards evidences a lack of
genuine issue of material fact.
First, Richards conceded that he moved out of the residence in September 2005.
(R. 87, f 1). While Brown stated he moved out in August 2005 (R. 83, ^8), this factual
dispute of a single month was not material to the Court's determination because
regardless of what date the court accepted, it would not alter its decision.
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Second, Richards did not rely on hi^ a — • >• * *

: \ :.. u: r

temporary orders in responding to the motion for summary judgment. It is not mentioned
in iir, o-sponse.
Third, Richards did rely on hi^ V uiinl iViiii. in ,|n ( itiealk sialing IVtituner
states in his Verified petition for Paternity and Related Matters that he considers 1 Ins
separation (lorn KosponJiiJ to be in caiiv 2006." (R. 88,^3). However, in so doing, he
did not provide the Court with any specific ivK'PMi' i" in an\ paragraph in the verified
petition. Further, the statement is the equivalent not to a statement of f ;n

I

>econu. .... Venfied Petition suffers from the same deficiencies which were
present in Pentea)sl

1 < i. • 11; 11»1 s \ o i i 11 *i s 111 o i• 11111 t1 Ioc 11111ciI I, not merely the factual

assertions contained therein The verification is subject to th
.- i-anon .i;id " belie;.

l-'inally, the only relevant allegation in the verified petition is

a hybrid statement of fin I anil i out lusit HI I !•'"", \, || I 11 As such, Ihe veri.fi.ed petition does
not meet the requirements of Rule 56(e), Utah R. ("iv I\
Assuming arguendo verified petition could be properly considered, it
nonetheless r< ' ' » • -** • -!

.:*r.: . ;\i< tactual assertions contained in

Brown's affidavit. The verified petition did not rebi itllio farr, iluil in iln, 'iiimmei ««, I
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.:, i omaniic aspects of the relationship terminated, including all sexual relations.

(R. 83, fU5

iK'd p^'tili.

:.,:i t eu., ;i - ;act that Richards moved out of

Brown^ house m August 2005. (R. 83,*'8i. Th^n ^

,

-J---

;ot

create a genuine issue of material fact which would have precluded summary judp' - r t.
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Without a genuine issue of material fact, there was absolutely no basis for the Court to
hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of when cohabitation.
Without a question of fact, the Court properly granted summary judgment. The
issue before the Court was whether the petition was timely filed. While it may have
required the consideration of some underlying facts, the ultimate determination on the
timeliness of filing under the common law marriage, the statute of repose is a question of
law. See Nolan v. Hoopiiaina, 2006 UT 53, \ 19, 144 P.3d 1129; Russell Packard Dev.,
Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14,f18, 108 P.3d 741. Gramlich v. Munsey, 838 P.2d 1131,
1132 (Utah 1992); and McKean v. McBride, 884 P.2d 1314, 1316-17 (Utah App. 1994),
cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995). Therefore, the Court correctly decided the issue
as a matter of law without holding an evidentiary hearing.

V.
THE COURT PROPERLY GRANTED THE PROTECTIVE ORDER
Contrary to Richards's assertions, the trial court properly granted the protective
order. It is without question that the trial court has the right to limit discovery. In
reviewing such questions, this Court applies an abuse of discretion standard. Cannon v.
Salt Lake Reg'l Med Or., 2005 UT App 352, f 7, 121 P.3d 74.
In the instant case, the trial court granted Brown's protective order and denied
Richards the right to pursue discovery. The basis of this decision was not only the
proximity of the requests to the date of trial, but Richards's failure to comply with the
clear dictates of Rule 26(d), Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 26(d) is crystal clear:
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(d) Sequence and timing of discovery. Except for cases exenh i t^ut; M.« »di
(a)(2), except as authorized under these rules, or unless otherw i^e stipulatea L\ :;K
unities or ordered by the court, a party may not seek discovery from any source
..•-.-•TCthe parties have met and conferred as required by subJi\ ision «r
Rule 26(d), UtahR. Civ. P Oespitr lu\ IIIJJ, been spa ilic'ill1, \ KICIVJ o> ux \ ourt f o do
so, Richards failed to initiate an attorney planning conference to con vr
• ». J and therefore was not entitled to discovei v i U. :
basis for the Co*

+

?

'is

;

While not a

.HI iiliiilit u.il lusi 1 - - .: p T? hit vk\ «-ion was Richards

filing of his Certificate of Readiness for Trial wherein he affir -•'•

• •-!••

tlle

('"*Mid that all discovery had been completed. r P • 39-140).
ThetiLi! (Hiiil in n .I, rw'iviscd lis disuc; :, m granting the protective oidci
With trial two weeks away and the complete failure *
Richards certificate of readiness for trial containing his affirmative representation
thai all dlsrm >•>.

:...

court did not abuse its discretion.

> 1.

11IE COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE LEGAL STANDARD OF UNJUST
ENRICHMENT
.ivi^iiards incomrll1' n««ii<" • I•• •

i

-;K . > apj\v the correct legal

standard for a claim of unjust enrichment, iu die contrary, the Court convclh ' Jippliv'd
tr.v. iK.vy ,!nc.: , .A^\ correctly determined that Richards failed to meet his burden of
proof.
The elements for a claim of unjust enrichment are M t ..:'<* •
P

K I : : : ,(/„.

-M These three elements include:
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(1)

A benefit conferred upon one person by another;

(2)

An appreciation or knowledge by the conferee of the benefits;

(3)

The acceptance or retention of the benefit under circumstances as to
make it inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit without payment of
its value.

Id. In its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, the Court correctly set forth
these elements. (R. 242-243, Conclusion #33).
Richards' arguments concerning this issue miss the point. Richards simply
failed to meet his burden of proof. Richards makes the conclusory statement that
Richards' payments toward the mortgage over a ten year period clearly conferred a
benefit upon Brown. However, at trial, Richards failed to provide the court with any
evidence which allegedly quantified that benefit. For instance, Richards could have
presented the Court with an amortization schedule from the lender establishing the
amount of interest and principal which was paid during the parties' relationship. He
could have presented evidence as to what percentage of that interest and principal
reduction was attributable to his payments. By so doing, he could have shown that he
possibly conferred a benefit upon Brown. However, Richards failed to provide the Court
with this evidence. It was not the trial court's misapplication of the law which defeated
Richards' claim, it was his failure to meet his burden of proof.
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Richards further argues that Brown had .

S was

being conferred upon her by Richards, To the extent that Brown knew Richards was
makiiiu p.«\ •

,.c L* using expense, this is not disputed.

Finally, Richards argues that under Ihe \ irriinI^I.UH I *« il \\ \ mid he inequitable to
permit Brown to retain that benefit without compensation to Richards. Richards further
.;. _»n - :

*:

representations concerning adding him to the title which
7

equates to the inequitable circumstances

^ M . ••; \ .njust

enrichment as it relates to the mortgage payments, i acre are two prubki. . i, w. w:..

. re was no meeting of the minds by the parties concerning putting

Richards on title, as it w "^

'•

!<••-.•.•

. us>io); -A \YX\ no detail, (Tr.

P 50. 51. and r":) Brown testified that at all times, any discussion
• i-

.,: . ii;^.,, vied i4 requirement that he pay her one half of the equit) wincl; was

m the property as a \ midilinn pivcednil lo |>i111111j• limi on Mile |Ti, I1 l,'/\ L 16-19 and
P. 98, L. 7-13) Based on these conflicting statements about th< i?'^ . .* v

r

t

I'oinjeninig putting Richards on trial, there was no meeting of the minds.
The C\

v*. • „vr .-muled to recover the full amount

of those payments because had he not been residing with It in. n lir w uM (i,,,i" in nil .1
a

»•.. nig expense elsewhere. The Court was r>^i Me u> adequately determine what

amount should be attribi

•

.u property. The best evidence

before the Court was that prior to Richards moving in v ifli Un w\ n, Jn ivntal a p» Im
' i of
her liouse to a friend for $300.00 per month. Thereafter, Richards began paying $400 per
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month, then $550 and ultimately $650 per month. After moving out of the residence,
Richards rented a housing unit for $750 per month. Thus, the Court concluded that the
amounts he contributed each month approximated the reasonable rental value. (R. 244,
Conclusion #37).
The Court gave little credence to Richard statements that but for his understanding
he was accruing equity in the residence, he would have made other choices financially.
The Court found that no evidence was presented to the Court regarding his financial
wherewithal to either pay a down payment or secure a mortgage. Richards took no action
to secure his position, which the Court found suggests he was not in the position to do so.
Therefore, the Court concluded it could not being to assess what portion of those
payments could have created a partial equity interest for Richards.
The Court concluded Richards failed to meet his burden of proof that any portion
of the $71,100 in payment unjustly enriched Brown. (R. 245-246, Conclusion #39). It
was not a misapplication of the law, it was a failure on Richards part to prove his case.
As such, this Court should affirm the decision of the trial court.
VII
THE COURT PROPERLY DISTINGUISHED BETWEEN HOME
IMPROVEMENT AND MAINTENANCE EXPENSES
The trial court properly distinguished home improvement expenses and
maintenance expenses. Richards' argument is that he was entitled not only to restitution
for the payments he made but also for appreciation on those payments. After considering
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the matters before it, the Court essentially found Richn • . • - • , . .

»::?;.:; >ed

.MI is^ iixtua N !ic paid for which attached to the property (i.e. the deck, swamp cooler,
; n ten ance expenses (i,e lawn care service). ThU

and ceiling f>

distinction is significant. The Court found Rich

egardmg a

benefit being conferred upon Brown only with respect to those fixtures for which
H ii hards f\,u l 11 >w n u „ Hit: li Ml *•» nil t found with respect to all other expenditures
relating to the care or maintenance o*" f h< *< .»^..

..x • a * burden of

proof. (R. 243, Conclusion 34 and 35), Flxus, the Court correctly distinguish*-!

/

lirhwrn fixtuu's \ cisus routine maintenance, but more importantly those items for which
Richards did and did not meet 1
VIII
RT

CORRECTLY RULED ON ALL CLAIMS RELAIING TO BOTH

THE MORTGAGE PAYMENTS AND EQUITY CI. \IMS
The Court correctly ruled on Richards failnl d» m. , I Ins, Imtdni nl proot Willi
respect to the claims based on his payments applied toward the mortgage, his claim lor
€-• .

a

^ .amiN lur a division of the appreciation in the

residence. As such, this Court should a PI . *% >;

..

.

It is undisputed that Richards paid part of the monthly mortgage payment dunny
hi1* Vn \("ii pen I i li'ilultiijiiiiiiii w nli Brown, However, based on the totality of the
evidence, the trial court ruled that Rich,mi* \* -T >!'»( eninli d m u* MUI any »>) the
mortgage payments he paid, nor any interest in the property.
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The Court found that no evidence was presented to the Court regarding his
financial wherewithal to either pay a down payment or secure a mortgage. Richards took
no action to secure his position, which the Court found suggests he was not in the
position to do so. Therefore, the Court concluded it could not being to assess what
portion of those payments could have created a partial equity interest for Richards. (R.
245, Conclusion #38).
The Court concluded Richards failed to meet his burden of proof that any portion
of the $71,100 in payment unjustly enriched Brown. (R. 245-246, Conclusion #39).
Because Richards failed to meet his burden of proof, the Court correctly ruled he was not
entitled to any reimbursement for any part of the mortgage payments Richards paid. In
addition, the Court ruled as a matter of law that unjust enrichment is a restitutionary
claim for relief. Emergency Physicians Integrated Care v. Salt Lake County, 2007 UT
72,110, 167 P.3d 1080.
In addition, the trial court correctly ruled that appreciation is not an allowable
measure of damages based on a claim for unjust enrichment. As stated over fifty years
ago in the case of Bough v. Darley, 112 Utah 1, 184 P.2d 335, 339 (1947),

M

[I]n an

action for unjust enrichment, in those cases where there is a proper equitable basis for the
same, the measure of damages, by the great weight of authority, is the reasonable value of
the services rendered." Applying the same to a claim for unjust enrichment based on
payment for fixtures attached to real property, the measure of damages is the reasonable
value of fixture, not the appreciated value of the property to which it is affixed. Finally,
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there was siinph no evidence before the trial court

^m.;.1 . ,:o\*

: . .

-. ese

fixtures increased the value of the property. Thus, there was nothing upon which the
Court - n i<!

•

- cost of the fixtures.
IX

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND RICHARDS FAILED TO MEET
HIS BURDEN OF PROOF ON HIS CLAIM OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
Thelii*!'—

•

* .'.•.. .*-. ;:a to meet his ^urden of proof on

the claim of promissory estoppel. This Court should affm

.. r.

The C u r t >; onclusions set forth the elements for promissory estoppel and
:

concluded th;

'

:

*• ;

* • uracil of proof with respect to those elements.

The Court concluded that even if Richards m«*i !

-

v. .1. s

promise to put him on title to the house, he failed to meet his burden with respeel in 1I1
*.'•'*

, «• •• ,wc reliance or damage based on that reliance. (R. 24(»,

Conclusion 4 i;.
First, Richards failed to marshal the evidence in support of the Cor" >
•

t

his i Iiaiitv w ww in'il leasonablc and that he was not damaged as a result of what he
alleged was his reliance. Second, Richards ^

*•

. •

-.

. e argument

relating to promissory estoppel. As such, this Court should not consider the *s-u
Rid*'

f

??

*\"'

;. J.LWJ. uuii in> testimony was more credible than the

testimony of Brown elevated to a he i uh

• M•

.

;i\; • ; ^ onduct

reasonable. Such is not the case. Without question, the Court has tlv,- r-ji
•^

- . ^;

icg.irak v> xA what testimony it found more credible, on the quantum of
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evidence before it. Where that quantum of evidence fails to satisfy the burden of proof, it
must deny the claim. With respect to the claim of promissory estoppel, the Court
correctly found that Richards failed to meet that burden of proof. This fact was admitted
by Richards counsel when she conceded there was no evidence presented concerning
some of the elements of promissory estoppel. (Tr. P. 163, L. 4-16).
The Court concluded there was no evidence that Richards acted prudently. The
Court concluded that a reasonable person concerned about the security of his position
with respect to equity in the house would have taken affirmative steps to protect that
interest. In addition, the Court concluded there was no evidence presented to the Court
that Richards suffered a loss. (R. 247, Conclusion #42).
These conclusions, based on the evidence before the Court, must be affirmed.
X

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO CONSIDER RICHARDS
CLAIMS OF BOTH IMPLIED CONTRACT AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST
The trial court properly refused to consider Richards' claims of both implied
contract and constructive trust. Richards specifically waived his pursuit of those claims
in closing argument. (R. 241-242, Conclusion No. 31). Richards stipulated that he failed
to prove any form of constructive trust or implied contract. Richards waived or
abandoned those claims. Therefore, he cannot now claim error when he induced that
conduct by the trial court.
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In addition to the foregoing Richard^ IV.1 '"

; -. ssues to this

Court. As such, this Court should not consider the arguments.
STATEMENT OF RELIEF REQUESTED
This Court should deny all relief rn]iii'slni I In Uu h.in I

In uldilmn, lliisiuiirt

should award Brown her cost and attorney fees in having to dciend against tin , ,ippi il

('iiNcmsioN
Richard failed to marshal the evidence relating to all factual, issiies R idiiinls ;ilso
w iii\ a\ Ins i i;>ln in appeal based on acceptance of Brown's voluntary payment of the
n^iiL. me Li:' " • f •

'

. e j arties cohabitation, their

relationship terminated. The Court decided the issue as i i

\, • •

evidentiary hearing was necessary. The Court properly granted the protective order
based on ilu; r • • • n

Tl p.\

with Rule 26(d), Utah R. Ch F ,

and Richards certificate of readiness for trial. TheCniirl prnp-'rh <H'Pli J llie roiia I
legal standard on the claims of unjust enrichment. The Court properly distinguished
home improvement expenses from maintenance expenses. Finally, Richards waived,
stipulated or abandoned his claims relating to implied
1 m v ourt should affirm the decision of the trial court.
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»

Respectfully submitted this /

T i n ^ p / a n Dijk>- - - "'
Attorney for Appellee^
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day of April, 2009.
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STEVE RICHARDS,
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vs.
DIA IN A BROWN,
Respondent/App* Ike.

Case (No, 21)080682

AFFIDAVIT OF MARY JANE JOHNSON
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P.O. BOX 0992
MIDVALE, UTAH 84047
(801) 347-0465
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County of Salt Lake )

Mary Jane Johnson, having been duly sworn, states and alleges as follows:
1.

'I ,ini '"'"iil.ii";,, l.ijk- jnidisuii, Ill</Accounting Director at Founders Title

Company.
2,

On October 6, 2008 check number 24078 was issued to Steve Richards

Jorpiivment in1]" f ender'Rnovn !ii HI. l!n; founders i • * Company Trust Account # 7.
The check was in the amount of $ 10,

1

^<

4.

The check cleared the Trust Account on October 22, 2008.
DATED this /b0_ day of YVLdAok/

of 2009.

^7^^^^^^^^'^-^
Mary Jane yol^son, fJ
HR/Accounting Director
Founders Title Company

Subscribed
and sworn to before me, a Notary Public, this
lubj

IJM'A

tyK day of

,2009.

USANKIMMEL
NOTARVKBUC'SWreOFtfllW
746 E.WINCHESTER ST. STE100

WOllJUmfli

Notary/Public

SALT LAKE CITY, UT8419T
COMM.EXP.01'10-2011
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240TR

n**©* -sKSKs.
DATS

AMOUNT

1OW2O08
TEN THOUSAND ONE HUHDRfJD IT11RTY-S1X DOLLARS AND NO TENTS

foxHC

STEVE RICHAKDS ' - '

gyDCR

PAYMENT PER LENQER/OROWf J

*~ "

£j

I'JLmii
'•02i,0<7fl«* •: i 51.30 i?50 3i:t« JL Olflfl*? »*«•
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
ihis is to certify that on the _/_ day of April, 2009,1 hand delivered a true and
coireel copy of the foregoing document to the person named below:
Suzanne Marelius
261 East 300 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, TIT 84111

45

